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Abstract. In this paper, the privacy of two recent RFID
tag ownership transfer protocols are investigated against
the tag owners as adversaries.
The first protocol called ROTIV is a scheme which provides
a privacy-preserving ownership transfer by using an HMAC-
based authentication with public key encryption. However,
our passive attack on this protocol shows that any legitimate
owner which has been the owner of a specific tag is able to
trace it either in the past or in the future. Tracing the tag is
also possible via an active attack for any adversary who is
able to tamper the tag and extract its information.
The second protocol called, Chen et al.’s protocol, is an
ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID tags which
conforms EPC Class1 Generation2 standard. Our attack on
this protocol shows that the previous owners of a particular
tag are able to trace it in future. Furthermore, they are able
even to obtain the tag’s secret information at any time in the
future which makes them capable of impersonating the tag.
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1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
Radio frequency identification(RFID) is currently considered as the
next generation technology that mainly used to identify massive objects
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in an automated way and will substitute traditional optical barcode
system in near future. The RFID advantages such as reducing supply
chain inefficiencies and improving inventory flow leaves no doubt that
the dominant deployment of barcodes nowadays in supply chain will
be promptly taken over by RFID tags. But it has its own drawbacks too.
As products flow through a supply chain, their ownership is trans-
ferred from one partner to the next. This transfer of ownership extends
to the RFID tags attached to these products. Thus all information as-
sociated with the tag will need to be passed from the current to the
new owner. However, at the moment of tag ownership transfer, both the
current and new owners have the information necessary to authenticate
a tag, and this fact may cause an infringement of tag owner privacy [5].
To handle this problem, tag ownership transfer protocols are pro-
posed to transfer the ownership of a tag from one owner to another
securely. The proposed schemes for ownership transfer protocols are di-
vided into two groups. Some schemes exploit a trusted third party(TTP)
which acts as a secure channel to transfer some information between
the entities. One of the first solution of this kind was proposed by Saito
et al.[6]. However, the security of their scheme is only based on the short
read range of the backward channel (tag to reader communication) by
assuming that it is hard for adversaries to eavesdrop on this channel.
Another scheme with TTP is proposed by Molnar et al. [7]. They exploit
the TTP to manage tag keys by a tree structure. But in this protocol
one key is shared by several tags which makes this protocol vulnerable.
The privacy of the whole system decreases quickly when more tags are
compromised [8].
There also exist some decentralized proposals without a using TTP.
Most of these schemes have two following assumptions: there is a
secure channel between the current and new owner to pass the tag’s
information securely. They also assume that the new owner and the
tag will be able to execute an authentication session in an isolated
environment without presence of the current owner after the ownership
transfer is completed in order to update some secret parameters.
For instance, Soppera and Burbridge [9] adopt the scheme of Molnar
et al. by replacing the TTP with some distributed local devices called
RFID acceptor tag. In [13], the authors have also proposed a decentral-
ized protocol relying on the assumption that owners are able to change
the tag key in an isolated environment. However, this protocol has se-
curity vulnerabilities well described in [14]. Song et al. [11] proposed a
scheme with introduction of a new property called authorization recovery
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which facilitates the ownership transfer of a tag to its previous owner.
But Pedro et al. [12] showed that their schemes has some vulnerabilities
as well.
Recently, two other tag ownership transfer protocols have been pro-
posed. The first scheme is called an RFID ownership transfer with
issuer verification (ROTIV) [16] which provides a constant-time, privacy-
preserving tag ownership transfer. The ROTIV’s main idea is to combine
an HMAC-based authentication with public key encryption. The second
scheme which is proposed by Chen et al. [17], proposes an RFID owner-
ship transfer systems which conforms the requirements of EPCglobal
Class-1 Generation-2 Standard.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate the privacy of two
aforementioned ownership transfer protocols. The investigation in-
cludes some attacks to violate the forward and backward privacy as
well as previous and new owner privacy properties of the schemes.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the privacy issues and properties required for tag ownership
transfer protocols as well as system and adversary modelings. In Sec-
tions 3 and 4 the description of the the ROTIV and Chen et al. protocols
and our attack on them are presented respectively, and finally, Section
5 concludes the paper.
2 PR E L I M I N A R I E S
To lend clarity to our discussions in the subsequent sections, in this sec-
tion, we outline the models and properties used in ownership transfer
protocol.
2 .1 SY S T E M MO D E L
In ownership transfer protocols, there are mainly three active entities
involved: current owner, tag and new owner. The owners in an ownership
transfer protocols are some readers in practice which take the role of
ownership in these kinds of protocols. The ownership transfer protocols
typically provide a solution to transfer the tag’s information from the
current owner to the new owner.
Most of the ownership transfer protocols consist of two phases, an
authentication phase and a ownership transfer phase. By the former phase,
the tag and two owners are mutually authenticated and the latter phase
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assures all three entities that the ownership of the tag is transferred in
a proper and privacy-preserving way.
2 .2 PR I VA C Y PR O P E RT I E S
Generic privacy properties and how to formalize them for RFID systems
have been extensively explored in the literature [1–4]. The two generic
privacy property we address in this paper are:
• Backward Privacy: an adversary should not be able to to trace
past transactions between an owner and a tag, even if it compro-
mises/tamper the tag.
• Forward Privacy: an adversary should not be able to to trace fu-
ture transactions between an owner and a tag, even if it compro-
mises/tamper the tag.
On the other hand, in tag ownership transfer protocols changes of tag
owner could occur frequently and at the moment of tag ownership
transfer, both the current and new owners have the information neces-
sary to authenticate a tag, and this fact may cause an infringement of tag
owner privacy. Therefore, there are two extra privacy issues dedicated
for ownership transfer protocols in the literature [10, 15]:
• New owner privacy: Once ownership of a tag has been transferred
to a new owner, only the new owner should be able to identify
and control the tag. The previous owner of the tag should no
longer be able to identify or trace the tag.
• Current/previous owner privacy: When ownership of a tag has been
transferred to a new owner, the new owner of a tag should not
be able to trace past interactions between the tag and its previous
owner.
2 .3 AD V E R S A RY MO D E L
In [3], Juels and Weis give a formal model of the privacy in RFID
systems. In this model, tags (T ) and readers/owners (R) interact in
protocol sessions. During this interaction there is also an adversary
entity A which passively or actively interacts with them. The adversary
may have access to an oracle which can be queried by the following
queries:
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• Execute(T ,R, i): This query is responded by the information of T
and R interactions in an honest protocol session at time instance
i.
• Send(P1,P2, i, m): This query models active attacks by allowing
the adversary A to impersonate some entity, a tag or a reader, P1
in some protocol session i and send a message m of its choice to
an instance of some other entity P2.
• Corrupt(T ): This query allows the adversary A to tamper the tag
to learn the stored secret information of the tag T
• Test(i, T0, T1): This query is responded by a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and the interaction information of the tag T0 and T1 with the
reader/owner at ith time instance.
2 .4 AT TA C K SC E N A R I O
In [3], the adversary A aims at tracing a specific target tag T. To do so,
she,
• absorbs the information she requires about the target tag T by the
means of queries previously described.
• choose two test tags T0 and T1 where one of them is T, and asks
the oracle for the challenge by Test query. The response will be
the interactions between the T0 and T1 tags with the reader R at a
specific time instance.
The adversary succeeds to violate the privacy of the tag by tracing it,
if she is able to distinguish the tag T between the two tested tags by
outputting 0 or 1.
2 .5 NO TAT I O N S
Here, we explain the notations used hereafter.
• Ek(.): Symetric/asymetric encryption function operation with the
key k.
• pkX , skX : Public and private key of entity X respectively.
• hk(.): Keyed hash function with key k.
• h(.): Hash functions.
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• PRNG(.): Pseudo random number generator.
• T, On, On+1: Tag, current owner and new owner.
• IDX : The identification (ID) of entity X.
• NX : Random numbers generated by entity X.
• mi: dynamic value m at time instance i.
3 ROTIV PR O TO C O L
ROTIV is a decentralized scheme which does not require a trusted
third party to perform tag ownership transfer. This protocol provides
issuer verification that allows prospective owners to check the identity
of the entity which has issued the tag. The authors have claimed that
their scheme ensures both forward and backward privacy and it also
preserves current and new owner privacy.
There are four entities involved in the protocol, a tag T, current owner
On, new owner On+1 and issuer I which initializes the tag and owners.
In ROTIV, the T stores a symmetric key k, a state parameter s, where
k is a key shared between the tag and its owner and s is an Elgamal
encryption of T’s identification information.
3 .1 PR E L I M I N A R I E S
Bilinear pairing
Let G1, G2 and GT be groups, such that G1 and G2 have the same
prime order q. Pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear pairing if has the
following properties:
1. bilinear: ∀a, b ∈ Zq , g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 , e(ga1, gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab.
2. computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1, g2) for
any (g1, g2) ∈ G1 ×G2;
3. non-degenerate: if g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of
G2, then e(g1, g2) is a generator GT .
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3.2 DE S C R I P T I O N
Setup: The issuer I outputs (q,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e), where G1, GT are
subgroups of prime order q, g1 and g2 are random generators of G1
and G2 respectively, and e : G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear pairing.
The issuer chooses x ∈ Z∗q and computes the pair (gx1 , gx2). The I’s
public and secret keys are:
skI = (x, gx1), pkI = g
x
2 (1)
I randomly selects αn ∈ Z∗q and provides each owner On with a secret
key skOn = αn and a public key pkOn = (g
α2n
1 , g
αn
2 ). All owners know
each other’s public keys.
Tag Initialization: The issuer I picks a random number t ∈ Fq,
where Fq is the finite field with q elements. Using a cryptographic
hash function h : Fq → G1, I computes u0 = 1 and v0 = hx(t). Finally,
I chooses randomly a key k0 ∈ Fq and stores: (k0, s0), where s0 =
(u0, v0) into the tag. I also provides On with T’s information re f On . This
information includes two dynamic values kold, knew which are updated
after each successful transaction and two static values δ = t,ψ = hx(t)
which represent the identification of the issuer of the tag.
re f On = (kold, knew, δ,ψ) = (k0, k0, t, hx(t)) (2)
Before accepting the tag, the owner can read the tag and checks the
authenticity of the static values of the tag:
e(h(δ), pkI) = e(ψ, g2) (3)
Ownership Transfer: The ROTIV ownership transfer protocol (Fig.1)
is a combination of two mutual authentication sessions between the
tag and current and new owners with the ownership transfer protocol
between the current owner On and the new owner On+1.
In ith time instance of the ROTIV protocol:
1. New owner On+1 generates a random nonce NOn+1 and sends it to
the tag and the current owner simultaneously.
2. The tag T also generates a random number NT and send it with its
status parameter si = (ui, vi) and a hash mi = hki (NOn+1 , NT , si) to the
new owner.
3. On+1 selects a random number rv and computes Av = u
rv
i . Then, it
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sends NOn+1 , NT , si, mi and Av to the current owner On. In this way, On
is able to authenticate the tag by computing,
ψ =
vi
(ui)α
2
n
(4)
Then, it searches in the database to see if ψ is in the database or not.
If not, it aborts authentication. Otherwise, it looks up T’s ownership
references re f On in the database to checks if mi = hknewi (NOn+1 , NT , si)
or mi = hkoldi
(NOn+1 , NT , si). For the former case ki = k
new
i and for the
latter case ki = koldi .
4. If the authentication process succeeds On gives On+1 the following
information via a secure channel:
re f V = (A, B, C) = (t, hx(t), Aαnv ) (5)
re f On = (kold, knew, δ,ψ) = (ki, ki+1, t, hx(t)) (6)
The new owner On+1 check the validity of the provided information by
(3).
Now, the new owner can verify whether the issuer of the tag T is I by
checking whether the following equations hold:
e(h(A), pkI) = e(B, g2) (7)
e(C, g2) = e(Av, g
αn
2 ) (8)
e(vi, g2)rv = e(B, g2)rv e(C, g
αn
2 ) (9)
5. If the verification succeeds, On+1 chooses a new random number ri+1
and computes:
si+1 = (ui, vi) = (g
ri+1
1 , h
x(t).gα
2
nri+1
1 ) (10)
mi+1 = hki (NT , si+1) (11)
and sends si+1, mi+1 to the tag and updates its database. Now, T au-
thenticates On+1 by checking the content of mi+1. If the authentication
succeeds T updates its state parameter to si+1 and its symmetric key to
the new key ki+1 where,
ki+1 = PRNG(ki, NOn+1) (12)
In order to prevent the current owner from tracing the tag later in the
future, the new owner has to run a mutual authentication with the tag
outside the range of the current owner after the ownership transfer is
complete.
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T On+1 On
NOn+1←−−−−−−−−−−−
NOn+1−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ,si ,mi−−−−−−−−−−−→
mi ,si ,NT ,Av−−−−−−−−−−−→
re f On ,re f V
←−−−−−−−−−−−
mi+1,si+1←−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 1: Ownership transfer in ROTIV
3.3 OU R AT TA C K S
In this attack, we target mainly the ownership privacy including current
and new owner privacy of the ROTIV protocol. Correspondingly, the
adversary A has been one of the owners of the tag T at least once.
For example, without loss of generality, we can assume that A = On.
Therefore, at a time instance e.g. i, she has had access to the tags’s
information re f On . We also assume that the adversary is passive and
thus has access only to Execute and Test queries.
According to the attacking scenario described in Section 2.4, the adver-
sary follows the procedure below to trace the tag T via distinguishing
that which of the two test tags, T0 and T1, are T.
1. A retrieves the static information of the tag T, δ = t,ψ = hx(t),
from the information she has been give at time i, re f On .
2. A queries Test(j, T0, T1) and obtains (13) and (14).
{NOl , NT0 , mj, mj+1, sj, sj+1} (13)
{NO′l , NT1 , m
′
j, m
′
j+1, s
′
j, s
′
j+1} (14)
which are the messages exchanged between the owner Ol and
tags T0 and T1 respectively.
3. A saves sj = (uj, vj) and s′i = (u′j, v′j).
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4. A checks whether (15) or (16) holds,
e(vj, g2) = e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
vj
ψ
), g2
)
(15)
e(v′j, g2) = e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
v′j
ψ
), g2
)
(16)
5. If (15) is correct then A outputs 0 i.e. T = T0, otherwise she
outputs 1 i.e. T = T1.
Note that we can write (15) because according to bilinear pairing prop-
erties of e, we have:
e(vi, g2) = e(hx(t).gα
2
l ri , g2)
= e(ψ.gα
2
l ri , g2)
= e(ψ, g2)e(g
α2l ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), gx2)e(g
α2l ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), pkI)e(g
α2l ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
vi
ψ
), g2
)
Using the scenario above, any owner in the protocol which has had the
ownership of the tag T is able to trace it. It is worth mentioning that
since the update procedure of state values s are performed independent
of their previous values (step 5 of ownership transfer), the aforemen-
tioned tracing scenario can be applied both on the state values of the
past and the future. Hence any owner who has accessed to the static
values of a tag is able to trace it at any time in the past or future by only
eavesdropping state parameter of the tag s. It implies that the ROTIV
protocol lacks both previous owner and new owner privacy properties.
Remark 1. It should be noted that if an adversary A′ has access to
Corrupt query which gives her this privilege to tamper the tag and
access to the tag’s static information t, hx(t), her state of knowledge
about the tag is exactly the same as that the adversary A in the stated
attack. Hence, she will also be able to exploit (15) to trace T in any
time in the past and future. This implies that the ROTIV protocol lacks
forward and backward privacy as well.
148
On the Privacy of Two Tag Ownership Transfer Protocols for RFIDs
4 CH E N et al’S PR O TO C O L
Chen et al.’s protocol is designed to meet the requirements of EPC Class1
Generation2 standard (ISO18000-6C) for passive RFID tags. According
to this standard, RFID tags’s computation capabilities is restricted to
only performing a 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) and 16-bit
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG). The authors have claimed
that their scheme ensures both forward and backward privacy and it
also preserves current and new owner privacy.
There are four entities involved in the protocol, a tag T, current
owner On, new owner On+1 and issuer I which issues a new issuer
identification to be stored into the tags after each ownership transfer
phase.
4 .1 DE S C R I P T I O N
Chen et al.’s ownership transfer protocol consist of three phases: re-
quiring phase, authentication phase and ownership transfer phase. In Chen
et al.’s protocol, the T stores two dynamic symmetric keys ki, k∗i and the
h(ti) which is the hash of the issuer identification. In addition to the
tag’s information the owner has the issuer identification ti.
In the ith time instance of requiring phase (Fig.2), the current owner
first signs the tag’s certificate ti and the identification of the new owner:
SGOn = SignskOk (ti, IDOn+1) (17)
After that, it encrypts this message with the next owner’s public key to
get Ci:
Ci = EpkOn+1 (ti, SGOn) (18)
and transfers the message (IDOk , Ci) to the new owner On+1.
In authentication phase (Fig.3), the current owner first generates a
random number NOn and then computes Ai:
Ai = CRC(ki ⊕ NOn) (19)
On On+1
IDOk ,Ci−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 2: Requiring phase
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T On
h(ti), ki, k∗i ti, ki, k
∗
i
NOk ,A←−−−−−−−−−−−
NT ,Yi ,Zi−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3: Authentication phase
and sends it with NOn to the tag. Upon receiving these messages, the
tag verifies the content of the message Ai. If the verification succeeds,
the tag generates a new random value NT , and computes the Xi, Yi and
Zi as following.
Xi = CRC(NT ⊕ k∗i ) (20)
Yi = k∗i ⊕ IDT ⊕ Xi ⊕ ki+1 (21)
Zi = CRC(Xi ⊕ ki ⊕Yi) (22)
Moreover, the tag updates its keys as:
ki+1 = (k∗i ⊕ IDT ⊕ NT ⊕Yi) (23)
k∗i+1 = PRNG(k
∗
i ) (24)
and transfers (NT , Yi, Zi) to the current owner. Upon receiving the
message, On checks the content of Xi and Zi. If this verification succeeds,
it obtains ki+1 and updates its values accordingly.
In the ownership transfer phase (Fig.4), the new owner On+1 uses
its own private key to decrypt Ci received in the requiring phase and
obtains SGOk and ti. Then, it uses the On’s public key pkOn to verify
the correction of SGOk . If the signature is verified successfully, the new
owner signs the ID of its own as well as the current owner’s:
SGOn+1 = SignskOk+1(IDOk , IDOn+1) (25)
And sends the tuple {IDOi , IDOi+1 , SGOi , SGOi+1 , ti} to the issuer I to
issue a new issuer identification for the tag.
The issuer checks the content of this message and if it is correct, it
issues the ti+1 and computes ti+1⊕ ki+1 and h(ti+1) and transmits them
to On. Upon receiving this message, On sends the former message to
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On+1 On I
{IDOk ,IDOn+1 ,
SGOk ,SGOn+1 ,ti}−−−−−−−−−−−→
{IDOk ,IDOn+1 ,IDR ,
SGOk ,SGOn+1 ,ti}−−−−−−−−−−−→
ti+1⊕ki+1,h(ti+1)←−−−−−−−−−−−
ti+1⊕ki+1←−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 4: Ownership transfer phase
the new owner and writes the latter one into the tag’s memory. The
new owner can also obtain the ti+1 by XORing the message received
from the current owner and the new key stored in the memory.
ti+1 = (ti+1 ⊕ ki+1)⊕ ki+1 (26)
4 .2 OU R AT TA C K
The adversary A in our attack is one of the previous owners of the tag
T. Therefore, she has had access to IDT , ki and k∗i , where the IDT is the
static ID of the tag T or the tag’s electronic product code(EPC) and ki
and k∗i are the dynamic keys of the tag at time instance i when the tag
has been in the possession of A as the owner.
Being given the messages exchanged between two tags T0, T1, which
one of them is the tag T, and another owner Ol at two consecutive
time instance j and j + 1, the adversary follows the procedure below to
distinguish which of the test tags is the tag T.
1. A retrieves the static identity of the tag T, IDT .
2. A queries Test(j, T0, T1),Test(j + 1, T0, T1)
and obtain
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{Aj, NT0 , NOl , Yj, Zj},{Aj+1, N′T0 , N′Ol , Yj+1, Zj+1}
Yj = k∗j ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj ⊕ k j (27)
Yj+1 = k∗j+1 ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj+1 ⊕ k j+1 (28)
Zj = CRC(Xj ⊕ k j+1 ⊕Yj) (29)
Zj+1 = CRC(Xj+1 ⊕ k j ⊕Yj+1) (30)
From (27), we have:
k j = k∗j ⊕Yj ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj (31)
By substituting k j from (31) in (30), we can write:
Zj+1 = CRC(k∗j ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj ⊕ Xj+1 ⊕Yj ⊕Yj+1) (32)
3. Now the adversary A defines the maximum number of iterations
as τ and follows the following steps to determine whether T0 is
the tag T. It should be noted that the same process can be used to
determine whether T1 is the tag T.
a) c = 1
b) computes:
k∗ = PRNGc(k∗i ) = PRNG(PRNG(...(k
∗
i )..))︸ ︷︷ ︸
c times
.
c) computes
Xj = CRC(k∗ ⊕ NT0) ,
Xj+1 = CRC(PRNG(k∗)⊕ N′T0).
d) computes ∆X = Xj ⊕ Xj+1,∆Y = Yj ⊕Yj+1 .
e) If Zj+1 6= CRC(k∗ ⊕ IDT ⊕ ∆X ⊕ ∆Y) and c < τ then c =
c + 1 and go to b
f) Else A outputs 0 i.e. T0 = T and k∗j = k∗.
This attack shows that the current owner of tag T will be able to trace
it at any time in future. Therefore, we can conclude that Chen et al.’s
protocol lacks new owner privacy.
Remark 2. It should be noted that the procedure above will work
when the number of iterations τ is less than the all possible values for
the key k∗j . This implies that if the length of key k
∗
j is n, τ << 2
n. So,
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the tracing process will work efficiently unless the number of passed
sessions are comparable to 2n.
Remark 3. Any adversary of this kind who has already obtained k∗j
from the above procedure is also able to calculate k j+1 by (23). Then she
will be able to extract ti+1 from the last message of the tag ownership
transfer protocol by using (26). This results in a more dangerous attack
in which the current owner is able to even impersonate the tag for future
interrogations.
5 CO N C L U S I O N
In this paper, we investigated the privacy of two ownership transfer
protocols. The investigation included the attacks to target the forward
and backward privacy as well as previous and new owner privacy
properties. Our results showed both protocols are vulnerable to the
attacks where the adversary is one of the owners in the system.
Any owner in the system as well as any adversary with the capability
of tampering the tag are able to trace the tag in the previous and future
interrogations in the ROTIV protocol. Therefore, this protocol lacks four
stated privacy properties, forward privacy, backward privacy, previous
owner privacy and new owner privacy.
Chen et al.’s protocol was also shown to be susceptible to the attacks
in which the adversary is one of the previous owners of the tag and
thus not to fulfil the forward privacy and new owner privacy. This
protocol also revealed the whole tag’s information to any previous
owner and makes the adversary capable of impersonating the tag in
further interrogations.
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